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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to rescind a contract needs to be drawn. The correct relation between
these rights is that the right to revoke does not give one the right to
rescind. The opinion in Rape fails to state this distinction and incor-
rectly implies that one's inability to rescind a valid contract bars revoca-
tion of the will executed pursuant to the contract. By citing cases"
from other jurisdictions that directly state that execution of a will
pursuant to a contract bars revocation of it,4 7 Rape v. Lyerly propounds
incorrect theories and promotes confusion about the justification for
specific performance of a contract to devise. The correct justification
rests simply upon the breach of contract to devise.
In conclusion, the North Carolina Supreme Court improperly justi-
fied the remedy that it awarded. Nonetheless, the remedy, conclusions,
and holding of the court in Rape v. Lyerly are proper ones. The
court's holding, that a revoked will can provide a sufficient memoran-
dum of an oral agreement for Statute of Frauds purposes, had no North
Carolina precedent but is supported by the weight of authority from
other jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the North Carolina courts' ability
to enforce an oral contract to devise realty evidenced by a will, promi-
sees are well advised to insist upon a separate written instrument con-
taining the promise to devise.
EVERETT B. SASLOW, JR.
Criminal Law-A Survey and Appraisal of the Law of En-
trapment in North Carolina
In attempting to apprehend persons involved in the so-called
victimless crimes,1 modem law enforcement officers have found it
necessary to set traps that are often quite elaborate to obtain evidence
needed for conviction. In setting a trap, it is often necessary for the law
officer or his agent to actually participate in the criminal act. The
46. 287 N.C. at 615, 215 S.E.2d at 748.
47. See, e.g., Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337, 24 So. 2d 730 (1946). See also
In re Estate of Ranthum, 249 Iowa 790, 89 N.W.2d 337 (1958); Brock v. Noecker, 66
N.D. 567, 267 N.W. 656 (1936).
1. "Victimless crimes" include crimes in which there is no "victim" or in which
the "victim" is a willing participant. Crimes relating to prostitution, homosexuality,
narcotics, liquor sales, and gambling are common examples. See Rotenberg, The Police
Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L Rnv. 871, 874-75 (1963).
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amount of actual participation by the officer can vary substantially de-
pending on the nature of the crime and the surrounding circumstances,
as well as the aggressiveness of the officer himself. This participation
can range from a minimal role of observation to substantial overt solici-
tation. If the solicitation becomes so strong that the government could
be manufacturing criminal acts when none would have existed other-
wise, the validity of any subsequent criminal prosecution must be
questioned.
Courts have created the defense of entrapment in order to prevent
government law enforcement officials from creating crime when none
previously existed. The defense of entrapment is recognized in the
federal courts2 and in almost all state courts3 except Tennessee.4  Al-
though each jurisdiction has its own definition, entrapment is generally
recognized as a defense when government officials or agents, by
persuasion, trickery, or fraud, induce or incite a person to commit a
crime in order to prosecute that person. In particular, courts have
required that criminal intent and design originate with the government
officials or agents rather than with the defendant in order for the
defense to operate. 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently examined the
North Carolina law of entrapment in State v. Stanley,6 in which it found
for the first time the presence of entrapment as a matter of law. The
defendant in Stanley was a seventeen-year-old high school student
charged with felonious possession of a controlled substance with the
intent to distribute, and felonious distribution of a controlled sub-
stance.7 At trial in superior court, Stanley, the defendant, admitted
that the alleged transaction had occurred, but he relied on the defense
of entrapment. Although the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the
charge of felonious possession, Stanley was acquitted on the charge of
distribution of a controlled substance.'
2. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
3. W. LAFA E & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 48, at 370 (1972);
A. LOEWY, CRiMINAL LAW IN A NuTsHELL § 13.06 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LOEwY];
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45(1) (1961). Although the status of the defense is unclear
in New York, entrapment has not been rejected as a defense there. People v. Williams,
38 Misc. 2d 80, 237 N.Y.S.2d 527 (County Ct. 1963).
4. Warden v. State, 214 Tenn. 398, 381 S.W.2d 247 (1964).
5. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); State v. Bumette, 242 N.C. 164,
87 S.E.2d 191 (1955). See also Annot., 62 A.LR.3d 110 (1975).
6. 288 N.C. 19, 215 S.E.2d 589 (1975).
7. The parties stipulated that the controlled substance was found to be lysergic
acid diethylamide (LSD). Id. at 20, 215 S.E.2d at 590.
8. Id. at 20-25, 215 S.E.2d at 590-93.
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Upon appeal by defendant, the court of appeals found no trial
error; however, the issue of entrapment was not raised before the court
of appeals.' Defendant then petitioned for certiorari to the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, but again he did not raise the entrapment issue.1"
The supreme court granted certiorari" and, upon examination of the
trial court record, chose to consider the entrapment defense by exercis-
ing its general supervisory powers over inferior state courts.12  The
high court held that the uncontradicted evidence showed that the
undercover agent of the state, in establishing a "big brother" relation-
ship with the defendant, had induced the defendant to commit the
criminal act and that the intent to commit the crime originated with the
agent of the state rather than with the defendant. Therefore, the court
found that the evidence compelled a finding of entrapment as a matter
of law.13
While Stanley is the first North Carolina Supreme Court decision
to find entrapment as a matter of law, the defense has previously been
recognized in North Carolina. The first case to consider entrapment
was State v. Smith.' 4 In that case an agent of the police illegally bought
liquor from the defendant. Although the word "entrapment" was not
used to describe the defense, the defendant contended that the conduct
of the police agent in purchasing the liquor should be a bar to prosecu-
tion. The court rejected the defense, reasoning that this technique of
trapping the defendant was a reasonable method of confirming suspi-
cions of illegal conduct. The court stated that "[i]t is not the motive
of the buyer, but the conduct of the seller which is to be considered."15
The defendant had broken the law, and he could not complain "that the
law of the jungle was violated."'16
The court reached the same result in State v. Hopkins," a similar
case that arose one year after Smith. The conviction was upheld in
Hopkins, and although the court noted that the methods used by the
9. State v. Stanley, 24 N.C. App. 323, 210 S.E.2d 496 (1974). The court of ap-
peals, in affirming the trial court's ruling, held that possession of a controlled substance
was properly found to be a lesser included offense of distribution of a controlled sub-
stance.
10. 288 N.C. at 25-26, 215 S.E.2d at 594.
11. 286 N.C. 547, 212 S.E.2d 169 (1975).
12. 288 N.C. at 25-27, 215 S.E.2d at 593-94 (1975).
13. Id. at 32-33, 215 S.E.2d at 597-98.
14. 152 N.C. 798, 67 S.E. 508 (1910).
15. Id. at 800, 67 S.E. at 509.
16. Id.
17. 154 N.C. 622, 70 SE. 394 (1911).
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officers of the law had been criticized, it was held that "the transaction
is, so far as [the] defendant is concerned, a violation of law."' 8
Almost forty years after Smith and Hopkins, the North Carolina
Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the defense of entrapment in
State v. Love.19 The court held that for entrapment to exist, the offi-
cer's conduct must amount to more than mere initiation, invitation,
or exposure to temptation, but must constitute trickery, fraud, or
persuasion. Although the improper conduct of the officer is an essential
element of the defense, the crucial factor in establishing entrapment
is the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. The Love court
found that, for entrapment to exist, the trickery, fraud, or persuasion
must be "practiced upon one who entertained no prior criminal
intent. ' 20
The North Carolina rule on entrapment crystallized into its present
form in State v. Burnette.2' The court held in Burnette that entrapment
exists when an officer or agent of the government, by persuasion,
trickery, or fraud, induces or incites a person to commit a crime in order
to prosecute. The court found it essential that the criminal intent and
design originate in the mind of one other than the defendant, and also,
that there be a finding that the defendant would not have committed
the act but for the inducement. 22 In utilizing this definition, the court
made clear that the major issue is the defendant's predisposition. It
follows that under this test of predisposition, the government's conduct
assumes importance only because the degree of inducement or incite-
18. Id. at 624, 70 S.E. at 394.
19. 229 N.C. 99, 47 S.E.2d 712 (1948). See also State v. Godwin, 227 N.C. 449,
42 S.E.2d 617 (1947) (problems related to entrapment discussed, but decision reached
on other grounds).
20. 229 N.C. at 101, 47 S.E.2d at 714.
21. 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955).
22. In order for there to be entrapment, the officer or agent of the government
must do more than merely offer the accused an opportunity to commit the criminal act.
See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 270 N.C. 357, 154 S.E.2d 485 (1967); State v. Kilgore, 246
N.C. 455, 98 S.E.2d 346 (1957) (per curiam); State v. Greenlee, 25 N.C. App. 640,
214 S.E.2d 246 (1975); State v. Stanback, 19 N.C. App. 375, 198 S.E.2d 759, cert. de-
nied, 284 N.C. 258, 200 S.E.2d 658 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 990 (1974); State
v. Hendrix, 19 N.C. App. 99, 197 S.E.2d 892 (1973); State v. Williams, 14 N.C. App.
431, 188 S.E.2d 717 (1972). In narcotics cases, such facts as inquiring to purchase,
arranging a meeting for sale, ready acquiescence in sale, and admission of at least one
prior illegal sale have probative value in establishing an inference that the intent orig-
inated with the defendant. State v. Salame, 24 N.C. App. 1, 210 S.E.2d 77 (1974), cert.
denied and appeal dismissed, 286 N.C. 419, 211 S.E.2d 800 (1975). For other entrap-
ment cases see State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E.2d 61, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832
(1960); State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958); State v. Wallace, 246
N.C. 445, 98 S.E.2d 473 (1957); State v. Bradshaw, 12 N.C. App. 510, 183 S.E.2d 787
(1971).
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ment helps establish the amount of active participation by the accused
in the crime: governmental participation is simply used as a means of
measuring the defendant's predisposition.
In order properly to analyze entrapment, it is essential first to
establish the legal basis as well as the policy rationale for allowing the
defense. Entrapment does not rest on constitutional grounds. The
United States Supreme Court has considered the constitutional status
of entrapment principally on due process grounds, but the Court has
refused to reverse a conviction allegedly involving entrapment on con-
stitutional grounds.2 3 Although the due process argument has not been
totally ruled out, it seems unlikely that a case of entrapment will ever
be decided on constitutional grounds. Since entrapment is recognized
as a valid defense in almost all jurisdictions in the United States,2 4 it
appears that even in extreme cases courts will acquit on the ground of
entrapment before reaching the constitutional question.
Since the entrapment defense does not rest on constitutional
grounds, courts have utilized a number of legal theories and policy
statements to justify the defense. One such theoretical justification is
that the government is estopped from prosecution because entrapment
is unconscionable and contrary to public policy,25 deriving from "a spon-
taneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent, though ductile, persons into lapses which they might
otherwise resist."2 It should be noted, however, that general state-
ments of public policy fail adequately to distinguish whether the ulti-
mate purpose of the defense is to protect a right of the accused or to
prohibit intolerable government activity.
In support of the position that the purpose of the entrapment
defense is to protect a substantive right of the accused, certain courts,
interpreting criminal statutes, have held that the defense is based on
an inference that the legislature did not intend for the given statute
to apply to a victim of entrapment.2 7  Consequently, if this unwritten
purpose of the statute is intended to protect a substantive right of the
accused rather than being a deterrent to improper government activity,
23. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See also Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United Statet, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
24. Lonwy, supra note 3, § 13.06; 22 C..S. Criminal Law § 45(1) (1961).
25. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445 (1932), citing Newman v. United
States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924).
26. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) (Learned Hand,
J.).
27. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445-49 (1932).
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the defense should be available without regard to the identity of the
entrapper. However, it has uniformly been held that entrapment is
available as a defense only when the entrapper is an officer or agent
of the government.2 s
Beyond considerations of the identity of the entrapper, courts that
have attributed the entrapment defense to an unwritten legislative pur-
pose have indulged in judicial inventiveness unless, of course, entrap-
ment itself has been defined by statute. While some ciimes require
a form of specific intent, most victimless crimes only require general
intent.2 9  For example, in the prosecution of an illegal drug sale, it is
enough for the state to show that the accused made the sale. No fur-
ther proof of intent is usually necessary. Since this minimal degree of
intent is present even when the accused is a victim of entrapment, the
transaction clearly falls within the scope of the statute.3 A search of
the statutes fails to provide any objective evidence that the legislative
intent requires the exclusion of the accused from the scope of the
statute.
Although there is general agreement that a victim of entrapment
should not be convicted, the reasons for such a position go beyond con-
cern for the interests of a particular defendant. An examination of sig-
nificant entrapment cases reveals the concern of the courts over the de-
gree of government participation and encouragement in the offenses.
Although drug-related crime as well as other offenses may be generally
recognized as harmful to society, the practice of setting traps for poten-
tial violators "is . . .a repugnant practice, distasteful at its best and
intolerable at its worst."'" The North Carolina court first expressed
its concern for such government tactics in State v. Godwin when it
observed that the state's case relied on a "broken reed" since the
28. State v. Jackson, 243 N.C. 216, 90 S.E.2d 507 (1955); State v. Yost, 9 N.C.
App. 671, 177 S.E.2d 320 (1970), cert. denied, Yost v. Ross, 181 S.E.2d 600 (1971).
See also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415,
281 N.E.2d 803 (1972).
29. See State v. Love, 229 N.C. 99, 102, 47 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1948).
30. In considering the offenses in which entrapment might be available as a de-
fense, it should be noted that entrapment is not limited to liquor and narcotics cases,
although problems of entrapment arise most often in such cases. See, e.g., State v. Cole-
man, 270 N.C. 357, 154 S.E.2d 485 (1967) (using profane language over the tele-
phone); State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958) (conspiracy to dynamite
a school building). Although North Carolina courts have not ruled on the point, the
better view holds that entrapment is not available when the offense involves the inflic-
tion or threat of bodily harm. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(3) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
31. Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415, 418, 281 N.E.2d 803, 805 (1972).
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criminal act "was brought about by persistent entreaty and duplicity. 8 2
North Carolina's policy supporting the entrapment defense as a
deterrent to police misconduct was explained in State v. Love:
Considerations of the purity and fairness of the courts and the
agencies created for the administration of justice gravely challenge
the propriety of a procedure wherein the officers of the State en-
visage, plan and instigate the commission of a crime and proceed to
punish it on the theory that a facile compliance with the officer's in-
vitation confirms the accuracy of the suspicion of an unproved
criminal practice,-for which the defendant is in reality punished. 33
In light of this reasoning it is clear that entrapment was created to deter
government officials from manufacturing crime where none existed
before. Since the main purpose of the entrapment defense in North
Carolina is to regulate governmental activity in investigating crimes that
often require no form of specific intent, the focus of judicial inquiry
should be the conduct of the officers and their investigative methods
rather than the state of mind of a particular defendant.
To implement this purpose of regulating governmental activity,
courts have -taken two divergent approaches; the principal difference
between these approaches relates to the importance to be given the
predisposition of the accused. The federal courts84 and the majority
of state courts,35 including North Carolina,3" have held that entrapment
focuses on the intent of the accused. Under this view no amount of
improper governmental activity37 is sufficient unless it is shown that the
defendant had no previous intent to commit the crime and that the
criminal intent and design originated with the government officials or
agents rather than with the defendant.3 8
32. 227 N.C. 449, 452, 42 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1947).
33. 229 N.C. 99, 101, 47 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1948), quoted in State v. Stanley, 288
N.C. 19, 28, 215 S.E.2d 589, 595 (1975) (emphasis added).
34. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
35. LoEwY, supra note 3, § 13.06; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45(1) (1961). See,
e.g., State v. Bagemehl, 213 Kan. 210, 515 P.2d 1104 (1973).
36. 288 N.C. at 28, 215 S.E.2d at 595.
37. In considering the problem of improper governmental conduct, it should b
noted that there have been attempts at requiring government officials to obtain approval
in advance of setting traps in a manner analogous to fourth amendment search require-
ments. These attempts, in recognizing the scope of the problem, also illustrate the need
for reevaluating the role of the defendant's prior intent in the entrapment defense. See
Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415, 418, 281 N.E.2d 803, 805 (1972) (requiring probable cause
before setting a trap); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49
VA. L. REv. 871 (1963).
38. State v. Crandall, 23 N.C. App. 625, 209 S.E.2d 834 (1974), appeal dismissed,
286 N.C. 417, 211 S.E.2d 797 (1975). Defendant's evidence went to the conduct of
the officers and their investigative methods. Since the evidence did not relate to the
defendant's intent, it was held that such evidence was neither material nor relevant.
[Vol. 54988
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The second approach to entrapment has been adopted by a minor-
ity of state courts,3 9 the Model Penal Code,40 and dissenting United
States Supreme Court justices.41 This approach uses a form of the
"reasonable man" test, a more objective means of applying entrapment
to a particular case. Rather than examining the predisposition of the
particular person on trial, these authorities hold that entrapment exists
when the conduct of the government agent creates a substantial risk
that the crime would be committed by a person who would not other-
wise have committed the criminal act.
The objective test used by the minority has the advantage of
conforming more closely to the policy of entrapment as a check on
governmental misconduct. The crucial factor in the minority rule is
the measure of participation by agents and officers of -the government.
Since it establishes a more clearly ascertainable standard that does
not vary from case to case depending on the predisposition of various
defendants, it is more likely that this method will be perceived by gov-
ernment officials as a viable limit upon their ability to set illegal traps.
The majority approach, with its preoccupation with the predisposition
of the accused and the necessity for a jury's determination of that factor,
is more likely to be viewed by government officials as more of a trial
-tactic than as a limit on police discretion.42
39. LOEWY, supra note 3, § 13.06, at 253-54; see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 3, § 48, at 371.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The relevant por-
tions are as follows:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation
with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining
evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another
person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by...
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other
than those who are ready to commit it.
See also the proposed statute in State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 241, 265 A.2d 11,
14 (1970).
41. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-50 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas,
Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-
85 (1958) (Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in result). Al-
though the dissent in Russell reasoned that the defendant should be acqtuitted by reason
of entrapment, it is arguable that on the facts of that case the rationale of the dissent
could be applied to reach the result of the majority. It seems unlikely that an offer
to supply a person with an essential ingredient of methamphetamine ("speed") would
create a substantial risk that the drug would be produced by a person who would not
otherwise have committed the criminal act.
42. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. Rnv.
871, 899-902 (1963).
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Beyond these basic policy considerations, it is necessary to con-
sider all the elements of entrapment, especially as they are applied in
North Carolina. In considering the definition of entrapment48 it is
important to distinguish this affirmative defense from those in which
the consent of the victim negates an essential element of the offense.
In such offenses, if the victim consents, there is no criminal act.44
Entrapment, on the other hand, is a defense to a completed criminal
act.46
Generally, entrapment is a question of fact for the jury to deter-
mine.46  In North Carolina the accused has the burden of proof and
must prove entrapment "to the satisfaction of the jury.' '1 7  The court
has reasoned that entrapment is an exception to criminal liability, and
that the defendant should have the burden of bringing himself within
the exception; however, not all jurisdictions place the burden of proof
on the accused. The federal courts4 as well as some state courts4'
require the prosecution to convince the trier of fact beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused was not entrapped. Since entrapment is no
defense unless the trap is set by an agent of the government, 0 the
North Carolina courts have required the defendant -to produce substan-
tial credible evidence that the person who set the trap was an agent
if the state denies that the entrapper was in fact its agent. If a
43. For North Carolina's definition of entrapment see text accompanying note 21
supra. See also 288 N.C. at 28-29, 215 S.E.2d at 595.
44. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 232 N.C. 602, 61 S.E.2d 626 (1950); State v.
Hughes, 208 N.C. 542, 181 S.E. 737 (1935); State v. Goffney, 157 N.C. 624, 73 S.E.
162 (1911).
45. See State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955). The defendant
in Burnette was charged with assault with intent to commit rape. The accused actually
raised two defenses-consent of the victim and entrapment. The judge instructed the
jury on both defenses. Id. at 174-75, 87 S.E.2d at 197-99. Since the victim's consent
and participation were crucial elements of both defenses, it has been noted that trial
courts may experience considerable difficulty in separating the two defenses. Note,
Criminal Law-Entrapment in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. RIv. 536, 544 (1956).
46. 288 N.C. at 32, 215 S.E.2d at 597, quoting State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238,
241, 265 A.2d 11, 14 (1970). It has been suggested that the issue be tried by the court
in the absence of the jury. Jurisdictions that have followed the minority rule have been
amenable to this latter view. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962). See also text accompanying note 40 supra.
47. State v. Cook, 263 N.C. 730, 733, 140 S.E2d 305, 308 (1965); State v. Bland,
19 N.C. App. 560, 199 S.E.2d 497 (1973). The Model Penal Code provides that the
accused has the burden of proof and must prove the existence of entrapment "by a pre.
ponderance of the evidence." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
48. E.g., Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966).
49. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415, 281 N.E.2d 803 (1972).
50. State v. Jackson, 243 N.C. 216, 90 S.E.2d 507 (1955).
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defendant fails to supply such evidence, the issue of entrapment will
not be submitted to the jury."
It is necessary in North Carolina for the defendant to show that
he "entertained no prior criminal intent."5 2  This requirement is the
part of the defense that has been criticized most often, both on policy
grounds53 and on the grounds that it is often unfair in its application.
To convince the jury that he is a victim of entrapment, a criminal
defendant must ordinarily admit while on the stand that he is indeed
guilty of doing those criminal acts of which he is charged."4 The fact
that the defendant admits that he has committed the act puts an infer-
ence of guilt in the minds of the jury that would appear difficult to
rebut with even the best evidence showing a lack of predisposition.55
The defendant with a prior criminal record is placed in an
especially precarious position. Depending on local rules of evidence,
once the defendant takes the stand to try to prove lack of predisposi-
tion, the prosecution may be able to introduce the defendant's prior
criminal record along with other testimony that could provide the jury
with rumors and suspicions of other conduct of the defendant. Besides
the fact that it is often difficult or impossible to ascertain the truth or
falsity of much of this evidence, the substantial prejudicial effects of
such evidence create substantial danger that the jury will convict, not
because of the acts in issue, but because of prior convictions. These
considerations mean that as a practical matter the government can go
to greater lengths in trapping a person with a criminal record of related
crimes than they can go in trapping a person with no criminal record.5 7
Although convictions may come easier when the accused has a prior
criminal record, the police conduct that entrapment seeks to prevent
is as reprehensible when directed to a multiple offender as it is when
51. State v. Yost, 9 N.C. App. 671, 177 S.E.2d 320 (1970), cert. denied, Yost v.
Ross, 181 S.E.2d 600 (1971).
52. 288 N.C. at 28, 215 S.E.2d at 595 (emphasis omitted); see text accompanying
notes 36-38 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
54. The North Carolina courts have held that the accused must admit to the crim-
inal act in order to raise the entrapment issue, thus rejecting the possibility of inconsist-
ent defenses. State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957).
55. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissent-ing). 56. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
57. Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REv.
871, 898 (1963).
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
directed toward an ordinary law-abiding citizen.,
Although it is unlikely that Stanley reflects any substantial changes
in the North Carolina law of entrapment, there are some significant
points in the case that deserve noting. Stanley is the first case in which
the North Carolina appellate courts have found entrapment as a matter
of law. Additionally, entrapment was not an issue in the petition for
certiorari; however, the supreme court raised the entrapment issue on
its own volition. 59 These facts suggest the possibility that the North
Carolina court is developing a more receptive attitude toward entrap-
ment.
Though the North Carolina Supreme Court may be increasingly
open to a broader view of entrapment, the extreme facts of Stanley
make it difficult to perceive any real change in the North Carolina law.
The court's reasoning focused on the total lack of evidence of any pre-
disposition to commit the crime. The state's undercover officer estab-
lished a "big brother" relationship with the defendant, and as the offi-
cer testified, the defendant had been unable to tell if certain substances
he purchased were real drugs. e0  Beyond these facts, the court
described the defendant as an "agent" of the law enforcement officer;
therefore, the court ruled that the defendant should receive some sort
of indirect benefit from the statute granting immunity to officers enforc-
ing the drug laws."'
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the holding in Stanley
relates to the value of prior convictions. The court held that "a convic-
tion of possession of marijuana would not indicate a predisposition to
commit the crime of [possession of LSD with intent to distribute]. 0 2
Within this context, the holding seems to go beyond an assessment of
the probative weight of the marijuana conviction. The implication is
that the marijuana conviction is irrelevant to the LSD conviction. 3
Therefore, the North Carolina court is apparently attempting to miti-
58. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). "No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to crim-
inality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police
conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society."
Id. at 382-83.
59. 288 N.C. at 25-27, 215 S.E.2d at 593-94.
60. Id. at 22, 215 S.E.2d at 591.
61. Id. at 33, 215 S.E.2d at 598. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.1(c) (1975).
62. 288 N.C. at 33, 215 S.E.2d at 598.
63. Cf. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1958), in which it was
held that a nine year old conviction for sale of narcotics and a five year old conviction
for possession of narcotics were "insufficient" to prove a present intent to sell narcotics.
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gate the prejudicial effects of introducing evidence of a prior criminal
record by strictly limiting such evidence to those crimes that bear the
highest degree of relevance to the present charges.
With the exception of the points discussed above, Stanley is essen-
tially a reaffirmation of prior North Carolina law with greater reliance
on the federal definition of entrapment. 4 Except for extreme cases,
the issue remains one for the jury to resolve. The court also
announced in Stanley that it will continue to focus on the particular
defendant's predisposition to participate in the criminal act. However,
the North Carolina court has recognized that abuses inevitably occur
when overzealous law enforcement officers set traps, particularly in
search of violations of drug laws. In correcting these abuses, it is hoped
that the court, recognizing the need for judicial intervention, will con-
tinue to search for the appropriate responses.
JOSEPH D. JOHNSON
Criminal Law-Diminished Responsibility, Long Ignored in
North Carolina, Is Given a Hearing But Not Yet Adopted
North Carolina has never recognized the doctrine of "diminished
responsibility," by which a mentally disordered defendant may be
deemed incapable of the degree of mens rea required for conviction of
the crime for which he is charged, even though his mental illness does
not reach the level of insanity.' In three recent cases2 the North
Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that it remains unwilling to adopt
64. See 288 N.C. at 29-32, 215 S.E.2d at 595-97.
1. The doctrine herein referred to as "diminished responsibility" goes by several
different names, including "diminished capacity," "partial insanity" and "partial responsi-
bility." F. LinmAN & D. McIN'nRE, Tim MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 355
(1961); People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 364, 406 P.2d 43, 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763,
772 (1965). In addition, the term "diminished reponsibility" is used to describe a quite
different doctrine derived from civil and Scottish law whereby the defendant's punish-
ment is reduced if he could not resist the criminal impulse. Id. Despite this confusion
and the fact that the doctrine "contemplates full responsibility, not partial, but only for
the crime actually committed," State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 292, 347 P.2d 312, 314
(1959), "diminished responsibility" is probably the most common term and is the one
used by the North Carolina Supreme Court. E.g., State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 699,
174 S.E.2d 526, 532 (1970).
2. State v. Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346, 218 S.E.2d 176 (1975); State v. Wetmore,
287 N.C. 344, 215 S.E.2d 51 (1975); State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305
(1975).
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